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NEW DEAL LEFTISTS, HENRY WALLACE 
AND "GIDEON'S ARMY," AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
PARTY IN MONTANA, 1937-1952 
HUGH T. LOVIN 
Many forces occupied America's sociopo-
litical terrain to the left of New Dealers who 
dominated U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's 
administration of the 1930s. Some fastened 
themselves temporarily to the New Dealers' 
coattails. Ideologically motivated, others touted 
their special panaceas for ending the Great 
Depression that had begun in 1929, and certain 
of the mainstream Democratic Party's expa-
triates added to this cacophony by pursuing 
their own agendas. Comprised principally of 
the Democratic Party's out-of-power people, 
another group wanted to restore Roosevelt's 
reforming to its 1933-34 height, change the 
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federal government's thrust to the leftward 
in. certain particulars, and impose New Deal-
style reform programs in states where the 
Democratic Party's conservative wing had 
gained the upper hand. 
Subscribing to the last proposals, self-defined 
New. Deal Leftists in Montana, a group whose 
members often labeled themselves as "progres-
sives," in part because they traced their politi-
cal identities to the Bull Moosers' Progressive 
movement in 1912, judged themselves as 
Roosevelt's only truly committed followers in 
the state. But they wanted more social change 
than Roosevelt's forces had accomplished and 
in 1937 broke away from the more conservative 
Democratic Party majority in Montana. It was 
a divorce between sides that had tired of their 
togetherness. l Then these Leftists reasserted 
numerous New Deal principles but sought to 
expand the scope of existing New Deal pro-
grams, tried to elect like-minded Montanans 
to public offices in 1938-48, and generally sup-
ported Montana liberalism in 1947-52. It was a 
fight that the Leftists lost. 
But even in failure, the Leftists' course was 
remarkable. They supplied another yardstick 
with which to measure the dimensions of the 
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many realignments within the Democratic 
Party that happened after 1932. A scholar 
labeled these readjustments "Aftershocks of the 
New Deal Earthquake."z Such realignments 
continued to happen. The most dramatic 
incidents included Dixiecrats migrating to the 
Republican Party in the 1940s to the 1970s and 
Green Party members to the Democrats after 
the 2000 elections.3 Meanwhile, among groups 
that rebelled earlier against the Democratic 
Party in the wake of Roosevelt's New Deal. 
of the 1930s, Montana's New Deal Leftists 
believed so strongly in their principles that 
they bolted from their old party instead of 
muddling through within the Democratic 
Party's reigning coalition.4 Moreover, these 
Montanans acted independently in a state 
where their political realignment seemingly 
had reasonable prospects for enduring. There, 
Montanans' old-time flirtations with radicals 
had left behind a residue of nineteenth-century 
Populist and early twentieth-century Socialist 
thinking as well as living remnants of a strong 
Nonpartisan League movement of farmers 
which made an appreciable showing in the 
1920s despite conservative efforts to suppress 
it. And in the northeastern sector of the state, 
Communist ideas and certain practices flour-
ished briefly in the 1930s in Sheridan County 
and attracted sympathizers in neighboring 
Daniels and Dawson Counties.5 Nonetheless, 
complex historical time-and-place conditions 
precluded Montana's New Deal Leftists from 
succeeding either in making their political 
realignment permanent or, along the way, 
becoming the main architects of the sociopo-
litical order they envisioned. 
Furthermore, Montana's New Deal Leftists, 
even though they failed in the end, contributed 
a significant chapter in the historical annals of 
movements in the 1930s and 1940s by plains-
people who were especially dissatisfied with 
the achievements of Roosevelt, his national 
administration, and Little New Deal forces in 
certain states. As in Montana, these dissidents 
threatened to disrupt conventional political 
life, and their dissonance received considerable 
nurture from a political milieu that seemingly 
gave them a fighting chance to prevail. Even 
more than in Montana, a rich and dissenting 
Populist heritage from the nineteenth century 
remained intact, as in Kansas, Nebraska, and 
the Dakotas. In several Plains states, Socialist 
ideas thrived among these anti-New Deal 
critics, and they proposed modifications to 
mainline New Dealers' programs that they 
judged economically too weak and socially 
constrained by middle-of-the-road conven-
tionality. More important, as in Montana, the 
ranks of these activists in the Plains included 
many survivors of Arthur Townley's earlier 
Nonpartisan League movement, especially in 
the Dakotas, who helped to promulgate and 
struggle for left-of-the-New-Deal measures. 6 
They, too, constituted a lively component of so-
called aftershocks of the New Deal earthquake. 
Scholars have written at length about only a 
number of these developments outside Montana. 
Among the more dramatic examples of such 
Plains dissent, Milo Reno's Farmers' Holiday 
Association spread from Iowa to Plains farm-
ers who liked the association's ideologies and 
radical direct action practices. Sometimes with 
Communist intervention, these farmers par-
ticipated in incidents such as ones at Loup City, 
Nebraska, and Sisseton, South Dakota, in 1934, 
that had disturbing sociopolitical implications'? 
Different radical activists helped to convince 
12,487 electors in Nebraska and 36,708 in 
North Dakota to vote for William Lemke, the 
Union Party opponent of Roosevelt in the 1936 
elections. Meanwhile, other elements called for 
drastic changes and received a hearing in the 
Plains states for their scheme to create a farmer-
labor party that would implement production-
for-use economics in the nation. The latter 
became a force in South Dakota politics and 
generated considerable interest in successful 
farmer-labor party activity in Minnesota.8 
In the following pages, this narrative 
focuses on New Deal Leftists in Montana 
who, like other discontented plainspeople, 
attempted to establish better conditions for 
Americans. The Montanans' journey began 
in 1937; their political aspirations were largely 
frustrated in the ensuing decade. In 1947, 
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through a political marriage of convenience 
for both sides, the Montana leftists joined 
Henry Wallace's national third-party move-
menr, and the leftist-controlled Montana 
Progressive Party emerged from these nup-
tials. After 1947, though the Montana party 
encountered numerous tribulations, it sur-
vived but prospered little until explosive dis-
putes over Korean War issues and election-day 
setbacks destroyed it early in the 1950s. 
A BLEAK FiRST DECADE FOR MONTANA 
LEFTISTS 
After breaking away from the Montana 
Democratic Party conservatives in 1937, these 
New Deal Leftists created the Montana Council 
for Progressive Political Action (MCPPA), 
and through it, tried to impose their agenda 
in state and federal circlesY Subsequently, the 
MCPPA movement expanded, and by the end 
of 1940 its largely middle-class founders had 
lost part of their influence to like-minded but 
politically more left-of-center agrarians and 
labor unionists. The newly dominant compo-
nents included agrarian representatives of the 
Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union 
(Farmers Union for short), which was orga-
nized in 1902 and whose strength was rooted 
in the prairie counties of eastern Montana; a 
few leaders of American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) locals; and industrial unionists of the 
newly established Committee for Industrial 
Organization (CIO). The latter belonged 
mainly to one CIO affiliate, the International 
Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers 
Union and its locals at Butte, Anaconda, East 
Helena, and Great Falls.1O After 1940, Farmers 
Union representatives controlled the MCPPA 
by selecting a majority of the organization's cen-
tral committee, supplying most of its funding, 
and providing nearly all of the financing when 
the Farmers Union and several labor groups 
launched a weekly newspaper, the People's Voice. 
Herman "Cap" Bruce, often a spokesman 
for Farmers Union interests, edited the People's 
Voice until 1948, when a controversial figure, 
Harry Billings, followed Bruce. Enemies of 
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the Voice even accused Billings of holding 
pro-Communist ideas, and a columnist at the 
University of Montana's student newspaper 
alleged that Billings provided a forum to "any 
crackpot, poolroom pink who feels like blow-
ing off a little steam."ll The Voice, which was 
published at Helena until 1969, remained the 
MCPPA's main editorial voice. A few weeklies 
admired the MCPPA, and Hamilton newspa-
per publisher Miles Romney transformed his 
weekly into a MCPPA mouthpiece. 
In common with aggrieved farm and labor 
groups in different locales, MCPPA Leftists 
criticized Roosevelt's federal administration 
and Democratic majorities in Congress. They 
denounced the Democrat-controlled regimes 
in Montana's state government in 1938-46. 
For instance, they faulted Democrats in power 
for not compelling industrialists to bargain col-
lectively with their workers despite new federal 
laws such as the Wagner Act of 1935; they 
deplored resistance from the same Democrats 
to their demands for government-guaranteed 
"cost of production" pricing of agricultural 
products; and they lamented that Democrats in 
power failed to mandate more generous hours, 
wages, and social benefits for wage earners, the 
aged, and handicapped people. The Leftists pro-
posed local reforms including more restrictions 
on gambling and fewer state controls on wildlife. 
Also, MCPPA Leftists charged, Democrats in 
Montana had created political machines that 
corrupted the state's government.J2 
Active in state politics starting in 1938 and 
claiming to speak for all Montana "liberals and 
progressives," the MCPPA engaged in political 
action to correct the ills that it deplored. It 
helped U.S. Senator James Murray, a conspicu-
ous liberal in Congress, to stay in office during 
the next eight years.13 Otherwise, the MCPPA 
usually boosted in vain when it biennially 
endorsed sympathetic Democrats for state and 
congressional offices. Even the MCPPA's favor-
ite choices, Jerry O'Connell and Leif Erickson, 
repeatedly lost in elections. Despite MCPPA 
support, O'Connell failed, in 1940 and 1942, 
to regain the U.S. congressional seat that he 
could not retain in 1938. Erickson, sometime 
© 2012 Center far Great Plains Studies, University afNebraska-Lincaln 
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Sidney lawyer and a sitting Montana Supreme 
Court jurist, polled 89,224 votes but failed in the 
contest for governor of Montana in 1944. Then 
Erickson prevailed over veteran U.S. Senator 
Burton Wheeler in the 1946 Democratic pri-
mary. However, despite strong support from 
the MCPPA, which had assailed Wheeler in 
the past for his many disputes with Roosevelt, 
Erickson succumbed in the general election to a 
conservative Republican, Zales Ecton.14 
HENRY WALLACE'S PROGRESSIVES 
Despite little success, the MCPPA group 
persevered until it could seize what it deemed 
better political openings. Its wait ended shortly. 
On September 26, 1946, U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce and former u.S. Vice President 
Henry Wallace criticized President Harry 
Truman on grounds that Truman's foreign 
policies could provoke a war with the Soviet 
Union. Retorting privately, Truman labeled 
Wallace "a pacifist one hundred percent." 
Wallace also aired numerous reservations 
about Truman's domestic policies, especially 
those that had neither ended social and racial 
discrimination nor effected social justice for 
legions of other less privileged Americans. 
In reply, Truman expelled Wallace from his 
cabinet, and Wallace replied by renewing his 
attacks, thus raising speculation that Wallace 
might become the Democratic Party's U.S. 
presidential nominee in 1948.15 
Tired of inhabiting a political wilder-
ness since 1937, MCPPA people sensed many 
opportunities for them to exploit by attaching 
the MCPPA apparatus to Wallace's movement, 
and Wallace's allies piqued the Montanans' 
interest. Nationally, Wallace's supporters 
organized the Progressive Citizens of America 
(PCA) to boost for Wallace's cause, and 
Montana Farmers Union leaders were among 
the first to endorse the new organization. 
Then, partly on account of Farmers Union 
influence, the MCPPA had metamorphosed 
into the PCA's voice in Montana by the end 
of 1947, and its chapters at Butte and several 
other towns organized Wallace for President 
clubs.'6 Here, like in the old MCPPA, Farmers 
Union agrarians positioned themselves at the 
forefront and ensured that Chester Kinsey, the 
Montana PCA's first secretary, led the Wallace 
for President movement in Montana. Former 
manager of a cooperative organization in east-
ern Montana and a Farmers Union organizer, 
Kinsey finally became the Montana Progressive 
Party's state secretary when it was created sev-
eral months later. Subsequently, most of the 
Montana Farmers Union leadership continued 
to boost for Wallace even though James Patton, 
national president of the Farmers Union orga-
nization, later campaigned for Truman in the 
1948 national elections and insisted that the 
Montana Farmers Union not officially endorse 
Wallace's U.S. presidential candidacy in 1948.'7 
In short, the MCPPA forces had been 
finessed into Wallace's camp to their own 
liking. For the most part, these Montana 
Leftists had acted on the premise that Wallace 
sought the Democratic Party's U.S. presidential 
nomination. But Wallace was persuaded, late 
in 1947, to lead an independent Progressive 
Party and run for the United States presi-
dency on this third party's ticket.'8 Many of 
his neW Montana allies disliked this choice, 
and Romney-an old MCPPA supporter and 
the (Hamilton) Western News publisher-pre-
dicted that nationally "labor leaders and liber-
als" would not "stand up and be counted" for 
Wallace and his new party over the 10nghaul.'9 
Nonetheless, most of Wallace's new Montana 
followers stuck by him. In supporting Wallace, 
they ignored the weakening of his movement 
in 1948 on account of considerable Communist 
influence in his camp. Communists could 
be members of the new Progressive Party; 
Progressives like C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin, who 
was deemed "close" to the Communist Party, 
managed Wallace's presidential campaign; 
and Wallace reportedly eyed some of these 
same controversial Leftists, among them 
Harry Dexter White, for posts in his U.S. 
presidential administration. Consequently, 
many of Wallace's early liberal supporters, now 
offended by Communist machinations in the 
Progressive Party, established the Americans 
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fot Democratic Action and several similar 
organizations to oppose Wallace.2o 
When this anti-Communist resistance to 
Wallace intensified, most of the MCPPA crowd 
renewed their support for him. Having anteced-
ents in radical rural agrarian and urban labor 
circles likely influenced some to make this 
choice. Others judged Wallace's Progressive 
Party to be suitable political machinery for 
them over the long term. Meanwhile, differ-
ent MCPPA activists argued that Wallace 
deserved strong support because he proposed 
many of the social betterment measures that 
the MCPPA had called for since 1937. Others 
believed a theory that Wallace's third party 
might evolve into a liberal-labor coalition that 
could replace the Democratic Party at federal, 
state, and local levels.21 Consequently, just a 
handful of MCPPA activists deserted, most 
of them going to Americans for Democratic 
Action, which charged that "Communist dom-
inated [labor] unions" and "Communist apolo-
gists" controlled the new Progressive Party.22 
Wallace's so-called Gideon's Army thus 
passed its first tests in Montana, whereupon 
his partisans circulated nominating petitions 
by which Montana laws allowed third parties 
to place their nominees on the state's election 
ballot. However, Kinsey negated this work by 
selecting another procedure that Montana 
laws permitted-naming Wallace and his 
vice presidential running mate, U.S. Senator 
Glen Taylor, at a nominating convention. 
On June 26, 1948, such a convention was 
held at Helena, and the Montana Progressive 
Party was launched. But by not following, in 
June, certain procedures that Montana laws 
prescribed, it was necessary for Wallace and 
Taylor to be selected again, this time at a party 
conclave on September 4, 1948.23 
With the Wallace-Taylor ticket safely on the 
Montana ballot, Gideon's Army recruited new 
followers statewide. Principally a handful of 
Mine-Mill labor unionists, certain radicals, and 
reform-minded professionals were added. For 
example, Henry Maury-a Helena attorney, 
former Socialist activist, courtroom attorney 
for numerous radicals, and lately a convert 
NEW DEAL LEFTISTS 277 
to MCPPA idealism-became a Montana 
Progressive Party warhorse.24 In the opposite 
political spectrum, Montana Communists 
newly involved themselves in Montana Pro-
gressive Party affairs; like Communists in 
California, they backed Wallace despite their 
party's national leadership demanding that its 
locals desist until the Com intern authorized 
this course. Such directions arrived belat-
edly in the summer of 1948.25 Meanwhile, 
the Montana Communist Party, composed of 
seventy-one people in 1948 {according to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's estimates} 
participated in the Montana Progressive Party 
by exercising the Communists' influence in 
several Farmers Union locals and a number 
of Mine-Mill unions at Butte and Great Falls. 
More important, a Montana Communist Party 
official, John Hellman, led what he described 
as a "left" faction in the Montana Progressive 
Party. Most of Hellman's followers were Mine-
Mill union radicals.26 
Growing more slowly in the political middle, 
the Montana Progressive Party absorbed sev-
eral small groups that had, since the 1930s, 
advocated generous pensions for the aged 
and whom the conservative-minded Montana 
legislature had riled. More consequential, the 
party recruited successfully in a few differ-
ent middle-class circles. For instance, party 
organizers converted Jerome Locke and most 
of his Missouri Valley Association associates. 
This group proposed a U.S. Missouri Valley 
Authority similar to the Tennessee Valley 
Authority that New Dealers had established 
in the 1930s. A politically influential activist, 
Locke once presided over the irrigation farm-
minded Yellowstone Valley Association and 
flirted in the 1930s with midwestern radicals 
who wanted to organize a nationwide farmer-
labor party, but finally focused politically on 
federally controlled economic development 
in the Missouri River Basin despite resistance 
from Montana stockgrowers and commercial 
forces. Wanting no federal controls on the 
state's water resources, the resisters charac-
terized the Missouri Valley Authority plan· 
a "socialist" scheme.27 In short, in 1948 the 
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Montana Progressive Party had gradually 
become a broader coalition of forces, partly by 
adding special interest groups at a time when 
pollsters' data revealed that the Progressive 
Party was losing ground nationally. According 
to one poll, 51 percent of Americans wrote off 
the Progressive Party because they believed 
that Communists controlled it.28 
Adding these forces to the Montana Pro-
gressive Party coalition undercut the hegemony 
of the Farmers Union and its middle-class allies 
in the party, and intraparty conflicts ensued. 
A major dispute centered on the party's next 
political strategies. Led by Hellman, his fac-
tion {mostly Mine-Mill radicals} proposed that 
in addition to the Wallace-Taylor ticket, the 
party try to elect its own third-party candidates 
for Montana congressional offices, important 
elective posts in the state government, and 
many state legislative seats.29 This proposal 
evoked stiff opposition. Admirers of U.S. 
senator Murray argued that, were the Montana 
Progressive Party to run its own senatorial can-
didate, it would jeopardize Murray's chances 
of winning reelection in 1948. Furthermore, 
this group contended that Murray deserved 
help from the party because he tended toward 
their idealism even though he recently voted 
in Congress for several of Truman's Fair Deal 
proposals and supported the Truman adminis-
tration's alliances with "reactionary" elements 
in Greece and Turkey for anti-Communist rea-
sons. These activists also posited that Murray 
deserved to win with Montana Progressive 
Party help because he professed to be a good 
"friend" of "labor," the "middle class," "small 
business," and "professional men and women."30 
Furthermore, it was argued that running 
Montana Progressive Party nominees for 
state elective offices could deprive "liberal 
Democrats" of just enough votes to win over 
Republicans in 1948. And doing so seemed 
doubly impermissible in light of Montana New 
Deal Leftists always helping such Democrats to 
win since MCPPA days.31 Also, People's Voice 
editor Bruce contended that "with a full slate of 
candidates on the Progressive Party ticket, the 
hue and cry would be raised that [the] Moscow 
[regime in the Soviet Union] is trying to get 
control of Montana.,,32 
On September 4, 1948, this dispute ended 
when, at the Montana Progressive Party's state 
convention, Hellman's forces retreated and 
only a Wallace-Taylor ticket appeared on the 
Montana ballot in November. The victorious 
camp also wrote a platform composed of thirty-
five planks, which included public ownership 
of utilities, improvements in the nation's social 
security system, the forty-hour workweek, guar-
anteed annual wages, better unemployment 
benefits, and new restrictions on gambling 
in Montana.33 Conversely, Hellman's radical 
faction prevailed in Silver Bow County {an 
industrialized sector, including Butte and 
Anaconda, where Mine-Mill unions exercised 
considerable influence}. There, Montana 
Progressive Party radicals placed a slate of 
five candidates for the state legislature on the 
ballot over opposition from the Silver Bow 
Trades and Labor Assembly {which had sided 
with Democrats statewide in order to stymie 
Republicans in the coming elections}. The 
Progressive slate included three miners, a 
retired railroad industry employee, and a Mine-
Mill union organizer.34 
Begun with vigor, the Montana Progressive 
Party's election campaign lost its momentum. 
In part the campaign faltered because Wallace 
appeared in Montana only once, and Taylor 
staged just a few rallies in this state.35 
Moreover, Taylor's campaign style evoked 
criticism of the Wallace-Taylor ticket. Taylor's 
stumping, his critics alleged, exhibited show-
manship {earlier he was a local entertainer in 
Idaho} but little intellectual depth.36 At the 
same time, nearly nationwide "vilification" 
of Wallace and Gideon's Army harmed the 
Montana Progressive Party ticket in Montana. 
According to People's Voice editor Bruce, party 
locals lacked enough resources and access to 
"channels of communication" to rebut such 
"red herring propaganda" successfullyY 
The party's electoral prospects improved 
briefly when the national Mine-Mill union orga-
nization endorsed Wallace, and most of its state 
and local unions followed suit. Also, several of 
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the CIO's United Mine Workers local unions in 
Montana supported the Wallace-Taylor ticket.38 
But lethargy returned after this upturn 
even though the Progressive Party's national 
organization advanced $2,000 for the Montana 
Progressive Party to expend on bettering its 
electioneering.39 Most of the windfall paid for 
printed material and the expenses of party 
campaigners. Nonetheless, the party encoun-
tered new problems. Belatedly, much of its labor 
support evaporated when unions, other than 
certain local Mine-Mill groups, rallied behind 
Democrats in the 1948 elections. Secondly, 
Montana collegians remained mostly disinter-
ested despite considerable student support for 
Wallace in other states, and Montana's popu-
lation contained few Jewish and other ethnic 
minorities that were Progressive Party main-
stays in major urban areas.40 Thirdly, Montana 
Progressive Party sympathizers tended to with-
hold their help on grounds that, given the reali-
ties of Montana's politics, the Wallace-Taylor 
ticket could not win because the "kept press" 
of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company 
opposed it. Different Montanans judged the 
Montana Progressive Party and its national 
parent as irrelevant inasmuch as they believed 
that both parties' ideology grappled little with 
American socioeconomic conditions late in 
the 1940s. Even Wallace Progressives some-
times agreed, saying their movement's think-
ing seemed to echo many of the bygone New 
Deal's responses to Great Depression tribula-
tions in the 1930s. For example, Verda Barnes, 
Progressive Party National Committee member 
who supervised Progressive election campaigns 
in the Far West in 1948, had concluded that 
American farmers, workers, and small busi-
ness people fared "pretty well" in post-World 
War II times and would generally support the 
Progressive Party only when "their plight," as in 
the 1930s, became "so desperate they have noth-
ing to lose by so doing.'>41 
ON THE SAME COURSE 
On election day 1948 the Wallace-Taylor 
ticket polled only 3.3 percent of all votes 
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in Montana but as much as 10.6 percent in 
Roosevelt County (an eastern Montana strong-
hold of the Farmers Union) and more in Silver 
Bow County than in any other.42 Nonetheless, 
the Montana Progressive Party's conservative 
and radical factions saw silver linings in the 
election outcomes. The former claimed that 
because the party nominated only a Wallace-
Taylor ticket, Murray preserved his U.S. Senate 
seat, and that in the Democratic Party's 1948 
landslide in Montana, the party helped liberal-
minded Democrats to prevail by running no 
candidates.43 Conversely, the same group could 
not brag because one of its favorites, Judge 
Erickson of the Montana Supreme Court, ran 
third in the primaries among Democrats seeking 
the state's governorship.44 For its part, Hellman's 
"left" camp claimed vindication for its liking 
for third-party political action. The camp's five 
nominees for the state legislature from Silver 
Bow County polled 30 to 40 percent of the 
10,000 votes by which each could win.45 
Even though certain Gideons credited it 
with an "impact of vital importance" in 1948, 
the Montana Progressive Party lost members in 
the next two years to the Democratic Party, and 
its national parent fared worse, losing much of 
its political "center and right."46 The Montana 
Progressive Party faithful warned the defectors 
that changing sides made them "apologists for 
war [with the Soviet Union] and increased mili-
tarization" because of Truman's foreign policies 
and his desire for a universal military training 
program for all youth. But such rhetoric deterred 
few from leaving. The defectors typically 
decided, as Senator Murray had done recently, 
to recant their latest political pasts and make 
their peace with Truman and his 1948 victors. 
(As for Murray, he anticipated a new place in the 
Montana Democratic Party where Murray and 
newcomers Congressmen Mike Mansfield and 
Lee Metcalfwere influential liberal voices.) Many 
of these Montana Progressive Party expatriates 
particularly applauded Mansfield and Metcalf for 
supporting new proposals for a federal Missouri 
Valley Authority even though Truman had 
downplayed the scheme after his party's whip-
ping in the 1946 midterm elections.47 
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These defections left the Montana Pro-
gressive Party weakened but active and still 
dominated by Farmers Union activists and 
their middle-class and labor union allies. 
Their protege-Kinsey, Montana Progressive 
Party state secretary-remained at the helm. 
Much of the party's "sporadic activities" in 
1949 centered in the organization's Progressive 
Club at Great Falls.4s On a different front, the 
old Montana Progressive Citizens of America 
was reorganized and assigned a key role in the 
coming Montana Progressive Party campaign 
in 1950 at which it would explain and defend 
the party's reform ideologies. The party's 
plans also entailed backing Wallace if he ran 
a second time for the u.s. presidency in 1952. 
Meanwhile, the Kinsey-led agrarians and their 
helpers united with the party's Hellman-led 
radicals to attack the Truman administration's 
foreign policies more vigorously. Their main 
targets included Truman's Marshall Plan to 
prevent the Soviet Union from expanding 
its sphere in Europe. Taking their cue from 
Wallace, who had characterized the Marshall 
Plan as "give guns to people when they want 
plows," these critics charged that the Marshall 
Plan would precipitate "Cold War Calamity.'>49 
Using this unity to their own advantage, 
Hellman's radicals demanded third-party polit-
ical action to elect the mayor and aldermen 
for three wards in Great Falls. The in-power 
side acquiesced, despite past MCPPA and MPP 
practices, in trying to elect liberal Democrats 
to Montana public offices. The third-party 
strategy little benefited the radicals, proving, 
both sides concluded, that "only 10 percent 
of the people at Great Falls will support a 
Progressive Party candidate," and double this 
number might be "high pressure[d]" to do so. 50 
NEW TROUBLES: KOREAN WAR DISPUTES 
AND POOR SHOWINGS AT THE POLLS 
This new comity in the Montana Progres-
sive Party between the in-power group and the 
radicals lasted until June 25, 1950, after which 
time the party splintered because of develop-
ments in Korea and the Truman administra-
tion's response. On this date, North Korea's 
"Red Army" attacked the South Korean 
republic, and Truman sent American armies to 
defend the latter. Similarly, Korean war issues 
wreaked havoc with Progressives and to a large 
extent doomed Wallace's third party nationally 
after Wallace more or less sided with Truman 
on the need for American intervention in 
Korea. Even more detrimental to Progressive 
unity, Wallace withdrew from the national 
Progressive Party. In turn, Progressive Party 
organizations in twenty-two states deplored 
Wallace's choice, and a Montanan accused 
him of deserting "us when we needed him the 
most.,,51 
In Montana, the same developments so 
split the Progressive Party that it lost mem-
bers to the Democratic Party even though the 
departers once hated it. Meanwhile, Hellman's 
radicals denounced the Korean War on its face 
and accused Truman of helping the corrupt 
Syngman Rhee regime to remain in power in 
South Korea. Conversely, the Truman admin-
istration's actions in Korea were praised in 
opposite party circles, among them the bulk of 
the party's Farmers Union people. They viewed 
Truman as a fighter against Communist aggres-
sion in Korea. Disputing this interpretation, 
antiwar radicals exploited the new differences 
so outrageously that the state-level leaders of 
the Farmers Union intervened. Guided by the 
thinking of Patton, their national president 
who approved of Truman's Korea policies, these 
leaders deprived Hellman of his place as an orga-
nizer in the Farmers Union, and they cleansed 
their state and most local organizations of nearly 
all Communists and their sympathizers. In 
fighting back, they also repudiated the Farmers 
Union's old ties to the Montana Progressive 
Party and threatened to withdraw all Farmers 
Union subsidization of the People'S Voice.52 
Exploiting this turmoil, radicals seized 
enough power to position the Montana 
Progressive Party more firmly against any 
American involvement in Korean warfare. 
Hellman replaced Kinsey as the party's state 
secretary. 53 At the same time, these radicals 
gained an important supporter of their antiwar 
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stance. Billings, the new editor of the People's 
Voice, provided the radicals an editorial voice 
on grounds that he had detected "silent, but 
very real· and very widespread resentment" in 
Montana "over the Korean war." In saying so, 
Billings replicated distaste for the war in many 
circles nationwide.54 
More than just denouncing the Truman 
administration's Korean policies, Hellman's 
group, Billings, and several other Montana 
Progressive Party figures called-as the national 
Progressive Party organization had done ear-
lier-for a negotiated peace settlement in 
Korea. All of them argued that the United 
States had no alternative because American 
forces had been driven back from the Korea-
China boundary at the Yalu River to the region 
surrounding the Thirty-Eighth Parallel border 
between North and South Korea. There, it was 
pointed out, American and Chinese armies 
could only wage inconclusive campaigns that 
cost many soldiers their lives. 55 Maury, the 
Helena lawyer and Montana Progressive Party 
activist, called this proposal "a glorious work 
for peace." In an "Open Letter" to Truman, two 
Montana Progressive Party officials plugged 
for "peace instead of slaughtering American 
[soldier] boys in Korea," and other writers 
accused "war-making monopolies" of prolong-
ing the war. 56 The Montana Progressive Party's 
antiwar forces next organized "peace" rallies at 
Great Falls and several other towns. Korean 
War supporters fought back, charging that 
Communists had inspired the rallies, and at 
Conrad they recorded the names of persons 
participating in a local "peace" rally.57 
Korean matters aside, Hellman's forces 
demanded third-party political action in 
the 1950 elections but were persuaded at a 
state-level convention for selecting Montana 
Progressive Party nominees to shorten sail so 
much that only two candidates were selected 
(one for state railroad commissioner and 
another for the U.S. House of Representatives). 
In Silver Bow County, radicals nominated two 
of their own to seek seats in the state legis-
lature. Thus, the Montana Progressive Party 
abandoned the old strategy of the MCPPA and 
NEW DEAL LEFTISTS 281 
their own party of helping liberal Democrats 
to prevail in Montana elections. However, the 
Montana Progressive Party gained no ground 
on election day. At best, the party's candidate 
for railroad commissioner (Lawrence Price, 
party officer and vice president of the Cascade 
County Trades and Labor Council) polled 
about 1 percent of the statewide vote. In Silver 
Bow County, radicals fell by the wayside, poll-
ing about 40 percent of the 10,000 votes each 
needed to win. In Flathead County, a Montana 
Progressive Party sympathizer won a place in 
the next state legislative session.58 
Following the 1950 elections, little remained 
of the political coalition that had comprised 
the Montana Progressive Party in better days, 
but the Hellman-led camp barely managed 
to keep the party alive in the next two years. 
Trying to infuse new energy and attract more 
followers to the party, Hellman issued a mim-
eographed bulletin and publicized the party in 
sympathetic publications. 59 He also launched a 
campaign aimed especially at helping western 
Montana miners who had contracted silico-
sis. By his proposal, compensation to victims 
of occupational diseases must be paid from 
employers' contributions to Montana's state-
administered workmen's compensation system. 
In particular, a party figure added, by Hellman's 
proposal the Anaconda Copper Mining Com-
pany would at last be held "responsible for 
compensation to silicosis victims." Then, in 
1951, the party began a drive to secure 18,000 
signatures on petitions for a ballot initiative 
so that the proposal was enacted. Hellman's 
forces collected about 2,000 signatures before 
a committee composed of labor union and 
Farmers Union representatives commandeered 
the drive. But these efforts were negated by 
opponents who blocked the initiative from 
a place on the Montana ballot. They called 
the proposal "dangerous and destructive to 
Montanans in every walk of life.,,6o 
When the 1952 elections neared, Hellman 
anticipated good returns from the Montana 
Progressive Party by capitalizing on opposition 
to Truman's Korean War policies, the party's 
recent third-party political action practices, and 
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FIG. 1. Jerry J. O·Connell. Member. U.S. Congress. 
House of Representatives. 1937-1939. Courtesy 
of Montana Historical Society Research Center 
Photograph Archives. Helena. MT. 
a relatively innocuous platform that resembled 
the party's 1948 and 1950 platforms.61 More 
important in Hellman's view, his plan entailed 
selecting a prominent U.S. Senate nominee 
who could be juxtaposed on the campaign 
trail to Republican U.S. Senator Zales Ecton 
and Democratic U.S. Congressman Mike 
Mansfield. Hellman described these people as, 
respectively, an apostle of "reaction ism" and an 
apologist for Truman's Korean "war policies." 
For this role, Jerry O'Connell seemed an ideal 
choice even though his critics accused him of 
close kinship with American "Communists and 
fellow travelers.,,62 Formerly a U.S. congressman 
from Montana who failed to win reelection 
in 1938, 1940, and 1942 despite support from 
the Montana New Deal Left, O'Connell had 
sided with Wallace in his fight against Truman 
in 1946-48, helped to establish Wallace's 
Progressive Party at its national convention 
in 1948, and was executive secretary of the 
Progressive Party in Washington State until at 
last he returned to Montana where he opened a 
law office in Helena.63 
Unexpectedly, O'Connell declined to run 
again for office on grounds that he had aban-
doned strenuous political roles because of his 
worsening health, and Hellman revamped the 
party's course when his forces could not agree 
on another nominee in place of O'Connell. 
Finally, third-party political action remained 
the party's strategy in the 1952 general elec-
tions. But only Hellman and Lawrence Price, 
a party official and carpenter by vocation 
and labor unionist, ran for a state and a 
congressional office, respectively, alongside 
the national Progressive Party's U.S. presi-
dential nominees-San Francisco attorney 
Vincent Hallinan and California Eagle pub-
lisher Charlotta Bass.64 
AN INGLORIOUS POLITICAL ENDING 
Because of poor 1952 electoral outcomes-
less than 1 percent of the votes statewide for the 
Hallinan-Bass ticket and 2.4 percent of the bal-
loting for Hellman-the Montana Progressive 
Party disbanded even though the Progressive 
Party's national organization remained in busi-
ness until 1955.65 Already Hellman had aban-
doned the party, and most of his old followers 
sided against a handful of labor union radicals 
who wanted to resurrect it. This large majority 
backed away from the Montana Progressive 
Party remnant partly because none of the Mine-
Mill locals in western Montana seemed likely 
to supply any resources to rebuild the party or, 
as resurrectors proposed, to create a new party 
that functioned as the unions' own vehicle for 
left-liberal politics. To restore the party in any 
form, the same people also reasoned, invited 
repression from federal authorities and chief-
tains of the country's anti-Communist AFL 
and CIO labor federations. Such speculation 
was reasonable. Allied politically to Truman 
and his Democratic regulars, CIO heads had 
already expelled their Mine-Mill unions, in 
part because of their support of Wallace's 
Progressive Party in 1948.66 Moreover, Mine-
Mill official Clinton Jencks was just one of 
several of the Mine-Mill international union's 
secondary-level officials who had already run 
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athwart the federal government's antisub-
versive machinery during the nation's Cold 
War with the Communist world. And it was 
common knowledge in Montana that in the 
Red Scare of the 1950s, federal agents closely 
monitored Montana Communists, other local 
radicals, and their labor union sympathiz-
ers. One of the latter even complained that 
a federal agent hassled him because he had 
criticized capitalism too harshly and opposed 
American involvement in the Korean War.67 . 
Other Montanans subjected to such target-
ing included Hellman, whom U.S. Justice 
Department authorities later indicted for vio-
lating the anti-Communist Smith Act of 1940. 
His criminalization persisted until the U.S. 
Supreme Court freed him.68 
In sum, complicated time-and-place histori-
cal conditions so beset the Montana Council 
for Progressive Political Action and its succes-
sor, the Montana Progressive Party, for nearly 
twenty-five years that success was elusive, 
and many participants in the two groups' 
political realignment were driven back into 
the Democratic Party from which they had 
bolted. Moreover, the survival of the broader 
coalition of leftist forces became increasingly 
problematical after 1948 for several reasons. 
For instance, when the Montana Progressive 
Party coalition expanded in 1948 from its 
heavily radical farm and urban labor composi-
tion, stress was created, tension threatened 
to divide the party, and Mine-Mill radicals 
manipulated the new conditions in politically 
divisive ways. Meanwhile, it proved difficult for 
the party to endure when, in the 1940s, many 
electors judged the party's ideas to be irrelevant 
to post-World War II conditions in America. 
In another instance of trouble for the coali-
tion, Korean War issues splintered it so badly 
after 1950 that Mine-Mill unions gained the 
upper hand but could not save the party from 
extinction. In a different fatal development, 
anti-Communist ideas and governmental 
antisubversive measures prospectively threat-
ened the radical remnant of the old Montana 
Progressive Party so much that most of these 
frightened radicals sought cover by abandon-
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ing their rebellious politics. In other words, the 
wages of the historic Montana Progressives' 
political realignment-as one of the after-
shocks of what scholar James Sundquist called 
the New Deal earthquake-amounted to very 
little in proportion to these Montanans' politi-
cal efforts. Painfully, Montana Progressive 
activists learned the lesson that it was risky 
to become an independent political force, 
and the outcome from doing so was inevitably 
unpredictable because, down the road, his-
torical time-and-place conditions intruded and 
often could not be changed. Small wonder that 
Montana's New Deal Leftists gambled and lost. 
However, these unsuccessful Montana forces 
shared plentiful company when they failed in 
the end. Across the Plains, left-of-the-New-Deal 
groupings-whose dissent focused from the 
outset on criticism of Roosevelt and his main-
line New Dealers, sometimes to the point of 
accusing the latter of doing nothing about the 
country's Great Depression maladies-gener-
ally achieved little more than the Montanans 
did. Another of the so-called afterthoughts in 
the New Deal earthquake, these groups at least 
enlivened Great Plains politics for a time. 
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